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What can scholars of comparative literature learn from other fields about 
theories and practices of comparison? This article turns to actor-network 
theory (ANT) and its explorations of translation, comparison, and similar 
terms. ANT, it argues, offers an intriguing angle on such modes of relation. 
In literary studies, comparison has often been subject to stringent critique, 
accused of imposing false equivalences and oppressive forms of homoge-
nization. Perhaps, however, we can flip things around, reassessing critique 
via a stress on the complexities of comparison. ANT, as we will see, offers a 
relational ontology, in contrast to the ethos of negativity that has dominated 
literary studies in recent years.
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What can scholars of comparative literature learn from other fields about 
theories and practices of comparison? Comparing, after all, is not limited 
to disciplines with “comparative” in their title, but would seem to be a 
ubiquitous aspect of thought. Even if scholars are not juxtaposing literary 
texts or connecting cultures, they are still comparing ideas and evidence, 
discriminating between more and less adequate forms of argument. One 
cannot, in this sense, not compare.1 Admittedly, some fields have thought 
more deeply and extensively about comparison than others. In this article, 
I turn to actor-network theory (ANT) and its perspective on comparison, 
translation, and analogous terms. ANT, I argue, offers a novel and illuminat-
ing angle on such modes of relation. In literary studies, both comparison and 
translation have often been subject to stringent critique, accused of imposing 
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false equivalences and oppressive forms of homogenization. Perhaps, how-
ever, we can flip things around, reassessing the role of critique by attending 
to the contingencies and complexities of acts of comparing and translating. 
ANT, as we will see, offers a relational ontology that speaks directly to this 
question, contravening the skeptical or negative ethos that has dominated 
literary studies in recent years.2
Originally developed in the context of science studies, ANT is an 
increasingly influential method and a common point of reference across 
fields ranging from architecture to zoology. Its name, however, has inspired 
a certain amount of controversy and discontent. The currently most influential 
representative of ANT, Bruno Latour, was eager at one time to ditch all the 
problematic aspects of the term: “that is, actor, network, theory, without 
forgetting the hyphen!”3 A few years later, he has reconciled himself to the 
name: is not ANT, after all, the perfect acronym for a “myopic, workaholic, 
trail-sniffing, and collective traveler”?4 At the most basic level, ANT is a 
form of relational thinking: one that requires close-up (myopic) investiga-
tion, exhaustive (work-alcoholic) description, and close to the ground (trail- 
sniffing) analysis. Let’s expand on this definition by considering its key terms, 
before turning to the relevance of ANT for debates in comparative literature.
What is an actor? For ANT, it is anything that makes a difference. My 
coffee mug makes a difference in delivering a stimulant to my befogged 
brain; its handle makes a difference by inviting me to pick it up in certain 
ways. A rock makes a difference by causing the water running downstream 
to flow around it rather than over it, while its overhanging side makes a 
difference in providing shelter for tiny water creatures. “Actor” thus refers to 
acting-as-agency, not acting-as-theatrical-performance. Agency, meanwhile, 
has nothing to do with consciousness, will, or intention (a common source 
of misunderstandings of ANT), let alone with autonomy or independence; 
rather, it refers to the coordinated actions that link human and/or nonhuman 
actors. In modernity, humans severed themselves from animals and things 
because they saw their own agency as qualitatively different in kind. ANT 
refuses any such a priori distinctions between different kinds of being (which 
is why it is sometimes called a “flat ontology”). All actors exist via their rela-
tions to other actors, and humans are no different in this regard; we depend 
not only on obvious support systems—food, air, early care-givers—but also 
on the less obvious: software, serotonin inhibitors, and shoes.
“Network” is another source of frequent confusion. A network, in ANT, 
does not imply a network-y shape, that is, a web of interconnected horizontal 
lines. Nor does it have any special affinity with the Internet, computers, or 
technical networks. Rather, a network simply is an assembly of actors that 
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share information and coordinate action. It has no necessary size, shape, or 
scale. A network can be made up of soccer players, a ball, the rules of the 
game, and cheering spectators, or of chemicals, postdocs, hypotheses, and 
a lab report. At the same time, a network is not so much something we 
find as something we make; it is the pencil rather than the object drawn; it 
is a means of checking how much “energy, movement, and specificity our 
own reports are able to capture.”5 Network, in this sense, is shorthand for 
including as many actors as feasible in our research, the researcher included, 
and tracing the complexities of their interactions.
Perhaps we can see now why “theory” is also a misnomer. The emphasis 
in ANT is on description rather than explanation, along with a willingness 
to be surprised by the actors and connections one is tracing. As we’ll see, 
Latour rejects the view that our commitment to preexisting theories will 
inevitably determine what we discover. Instead, the goal is to allow various 
objects of the room to express themselves by offering them as much attention 
and care as possible. For this reason, Latour has referred to ANT as a form of 
radical empiricism, with a nod to William James; more recently, his colleague 
Antoine Hennion has drawn out the parallels between actor-network theory 
and pragmatism. This attention to empirical detail and relational models is 
clearly evident in the classic texts of the field, such as Annemarie Mol’s The 
Body Multiple, an ethnography of the treatment of atherosclerosis in a Dutch 
hospital, as well as Latour’s Aramis, an investigation of a failed attempt in 
France to build a semipersonalized transit system.6
While ANT has been influential in diverse fields, its uptake in literary 
studies is only just beginning. This belated reception is not entirely surprising. 
At first glance, the empirical emphasis of ANT seems better suited to fields 
such as sociology or science studies than to text-based and  interpretation-heavy 
disciplines. Meanwhile, its methods and practices are at odds with many 
of the prevailing assumptions in literary and cultural studies.7 ANT, for 
 example, has little interest in the linguistic turn; does not talk about identity or 
 representation; is perplexed by a certain theoretical vocabulary (fetish, ideology, 
structure); and is interested in making things more real rather than less real. 
Latour, especially, has become increasingly impatient with the rhetoric of social 
construction and the technique of distancing oneself from texts, attitudes, or 
persons in order to “trouble” or “problematize” their assumptions. In short, 
ANT is at odds with both traditional forms of ideology critique and with the 
various styles of poststructuralist critique still in vogue.
What ANT does offer literary studies are new ways of thinking about 
connectivity. An emphasis on relations is not new in literary studies (which 
has, over recent decades, challenged the idea of literature’s autonomy by 
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variously emphasizing intertextuality, discursive networks, ideology, etc.). 
What is different, however, is ANT’s view of these relations: in particular, 
its emphasis on connection as co-creation rather than as limit or constraint. 
For ANT, mediation does not subtract from the object but adds to the object; 
that I discuss Mrs Dalloway with my fellow students, read articles about it, 
watch the movie of The Hours, buy a mug emblazoned with a Virginia Woolf 
quote, has the effect of making the novel more real, not less real. Art’s power 
and presence are not attenuated by its relations, but made possible by its 
relations, which help bring it into view. (Our apprehension of this presence 
is not illusio, as Bourdieu would have it; it is not a projection, an ideology, 
or a metaphysics.) Meanwhile, any of the aforementioned actors—persons, 
texts, other art works, objects—may prove relevant to our description: noth-
ing can be excluded in advance. In this way, ANT offers ways of thinking 
about acts of mediation, translation, and comparison that could prove highly 
pertinent to comparative literature.
We can begin by noting that actor-network theory and comparative lit-
erature share an interest in translation—indeed, ANT is frequently described 
as a “sociology of translation.” In comparative literature, to be sure, the focus 
is on the viability and value of linguistic translation—a topic that has once 
again come to the fore in debates about the merits of world literature as a 
reorientation of the field. For some critics, the expansion of comparative 
literature to encompass a larger corpus of languages and literatures means 
an inevitable ratcheting up of translation. David Damrosch, for example, 
has recast the idea of “world literature” to describe those forms of literature 
that gain in translation, in contrast to other works that lose power in another 
language and do not travel well. Damrosch seeks to correct and compensate 
for the bad reputation of translation, noting that a translation may improve 
upon an original text by allowing readers to partake of several cultural worlds. 
Translation, moreover, is a vital mechanism in the creation of transnational 
networks of influence among authors as well as readers. While stressing the 
need to safeguard and promote the study of foreign languages, Damrosch also 
urges his fellow critics to be less shamefaced and apologetic about resorting 
to translations, as an essential means of gaining access to texts beyond their 
domain of linguistic expertise.8
To its critics, however, translation is at best a necessary evil and at worst 
a form of deeply troubling cooption—one that levels cultural differences 
and mutes linguistic otherness while encouraging a touristic sampling and 
nonchalant appropriation of other literary and cultural worlds. In a certain 
line of thought—of which Pascale Casanova is perhaps the most eloquent 
and forceful explicator—translation practices find their ultimate explanation 
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and ground in dramas of exclusion and hierarchies of power. As Casanova 
points out, certain languages (Latin, French, and now English) accrue much 
greater prestige than others. Languages do not exist in and for themselves, 
but via structures of discrimination and distinction; the tenet among lin-
guists that all languages are equal turns out to be utterly false in practice. 
“The ‘prestigious’ language,” she writes, “will (in a completely arbitrary way, 
through the simple fact of its ‘prestige’) exert its power and domination over 
other languages.”9 Such a language will be favored in translations: both 
as a defining feature of literary works that are held to be worthy of wider 
dissemination as well as the medium into which texts from other languages 
are most likely to be translated. Casanova continues: “Thanks to a circular 
causality that increases the self-evident nature of its position, the dominant 
language is the one that circulates most freely and easily throughout the world 
because it is understood by the greatest number of people . . . The language 
is ‘a travel permit,’ in a certain sense, in all directions.”10
Such critiques of the power dynamics of translation are widespread 
in both translation studies and comparative literature. Meanwhile, the 
recent English publication of the Dictionary of Untranslatables has triggered 
extended reflections on the question of “untranslatability” and the ethical, 
aesthetic, and political risks of translation. In several influential publications, 
Emily Apter ties the increased reliance on translation to the broader logic of 
a global capitalism eager to market exotic identities and cultures while also 
striving to render them equivalent via a common currency. Translation thus 
serves as a form of social homogenization, part of a more general flattening 
out of cultural and linguistic differences that might hinder the free flow of 
capital. The recent turn to world literature, in this sense, is complicit with a 
socioeconomic logic of globalization that it fails to seriously engage or chal-
lenge. In response, Apter invokes an idea of untranslatability “as a deflationary 
gesture toward the expansionism and gargantuan scale of world-literature 
endeavors.” Such a concept of untranslatability, she argues, could serve 
as a new theoretical fulcrum of comparative literature by resisting false 
equivalence and stressing the resistant or critical force of “non-translation, 
mistranslation, incomparability, and untranslatability.”11
From the standpoint of actor-network theory, however, translation looks 
rather different. Here, to be sure, it is conceived more broadly to include not 
just acts of linguistic transposition but the countless mediations that bind 
together human and nonhuman actors, and, indeed, nonhuman actors to 
each other. Translation thus becomes a key metaphor for thinking about 
relations. It is not something imposed on the world—an act of aggressive 
encroachment on pristine otherness—but something that defines a world 
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that is always already composed of acts of connection, negotiation, and 
 transformation. Translations are the means by which paths are connected, 
actions are coordinated, and meanings are transmitted. It is translation, for 
example, that allows the symptoms described by a patient, the blood vessels 
viewed under the pathologist’s microscope, and the images produced in the 
radiology lab to be brought together under the shared term “ atherosclerosis,” 
as described in Anne-Marie Mol’s aforementioned The Body Multiple. Such 
acts of translation are never faithful, transparent, or complete, in stark 
contrast to what Latour dubs “double click”—the fantasy of effortless and 
seamless information transfer that is promoted by computer technologies. 
Rather, we are always talking about transformation, deformation, alter-
ation, and appropriation of various kinds. As Latour puts it, “Everything is 
 translated . . . We may be understood, that is, surrounded, diverted, betrayed, 
displaced, transmitted, but we are never understood well. If a message is 
transported, then it is transformed.”12 There is always interference.
Translation, then, alters its object—here ANT is in accordance with 
arguments in comparative literature, including the often-invoked axiom 
“traduttore traditore:” translation as betrayal. This does not mean, however, 
that translation is just a vehicle of homogenization or false equivalence, 
echoing, in its imposition of sameness, the logic of capitalist globalization. 
Because translation occurs at every point in the network, the opposite is 
true; translation is associated with unpredictability, ambiguity, impurity, and 
increase in “noise.” John Law, for example, riffs off the motif of translation 
as betrayal—as both sameness and difference—to discuss a series of ANT 
case studies, including an account of the transferral of Swedish brick-making 
technology to Nicaragua. He writes: “for a so-called ‘transfer’ takes place 
there is change. There is translation. There is the creation of new relations. 
So there is change in Nicaragua to be sure, but also change in what is trans-
ferred.”13 No elements in the transaction remain unaltered and unscathed. 
From such a perspective, the idea of the untranslatable makes little sense. 
Indeed, we might say, translation lacks an opposite, because nothing can 
exist without the support of numerous coactors that mediate, appropriate, 
and alter it. It is no longer a matter of railing against translation as such 
but rather of gauging the uses and merits of specific translations—which 
involve losses and gains and misunderstandings, but also the possibility of 
new affinities and attunements.
This is not to deny the glaring imbalances in existing modes of transla-
tion, linguistic, or otherwise; that countless English texts are translated into 
numerous languages, while only four books in Hungarian and one book in 
Hindi were translated into English in 2013.14 This asymmetry is undeniable 
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and appalling. An ANT perspective, nonetheless, would point out that 
 translation is ongoing and inescapable; it does not cease when a book is pub-
lished. The vagaries of a work’s reception—as it is transported into the variable 
life-worlds, vocabularies, and assumptions of differing audiences—give the 
lie to any illusion of sameness. A new English translation of Anna Karenina, 
after all, is likely to acquire very different resonances as it is read by a US 
professor, a Dutch housewife, or a Hong Kong lawyer. Rejecting a top-down 
model of power (in which opaque social forces impose meanings on hapless 
and passive recipients), ANT insists that meanings are mediated, altered, 
and sometimes enriched as they are transmitted from actors to other actors.
Meanwhile, that certain ideas, beliefs, texts, are more successful than 
others is not just a matter of brute force; it requires alliances, diplomacy, per-
suasion, compromise, negotiation, seduction, wheedling. (In an account of 
Brecht’s translation into English, Andre Lefevere gives a good description of 
such compromises, as Brecht’s work was modified to speak to the concerns 
of US audiences. Rather than lamenting this appropriation, Lefevere shows 
how it was needed to make Brecht legible in a new context. “A writer’s work,” 
he writes, sounding very much like Latour, “gains exposure and achieves 
influence mainly through ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘misconceptions,’ or, to 
use a more neutral term, refractions.”)15 Networks are precarious and in need 
of the ongoing support of numerous actors in order to sustain themselves. 
Not all actors are equal, but all actors play their part and make a difference.
Here we can note some suggestive resonances between ANT and recent 
work in comparative literature, such as Françoise Lionnet and Shu-Mei 
Shih’s discussion of “minor transnationalism”; that is, forms of interaction 
within and across minority literatures and cultures. Questioning the usual 
academic language of center and margin, domination and resistance, Lionnet 
and Shih argue for different models of transnational connection. It is not 
that such connections are untouched by power relations but that comparative 
literature needs stronger yet more subtle and nuanced modes of comparison: 
ones that can attend to cross-fertilizations between minor literatures that 
are not scripted by the center; that are alive to the contingencies of cross- 
cultural interaction and lateral networks; that do not assume that translation 
is equivalent to homogenization; and that are not fixated on what they call 
a binary and vertical rhetoric of domination and opposition, assimilation 
and resistance.16
While their own reference point is Edouard Glissant, they might 
well agree with Latour’s aphorism: “emancipation does not mean ‘freed 
from bonds’, but well-attached.” In both cases, there is an emphasis on 
relationality as fundamental.17 We are always already entangled, mediated, 
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interdependent, intertwined; the language of exteriority and non-complicity 
expresses not just an unrealized idea but a fundamentally unrealizable one. 
Such relations are poorly understood via a modernist rhetoric that pits mar-
gins against centers, domination versus resistance. “Relational comparison,” 
Shih remarks in another essay, “is not a center-periphery model, as the texts 
form a network of relations from wherever the texts are written, read, and 
circulated.”18 Here ANT scholars would vigorously nod in agreement, while 
extending the point to enfold not only texts, but all human and nonhuman 
actors. From such an optic, then, relation and translation look very different: 
not as an oscillation between oppressive sameness and radical singularity, but 
as chains of association and mediation that have no predetermined politics, 
but that must be described in as much detail as possible by a trail-sniffing 
scholar open to contingency and surprise.
This openness to contingency should also inform our reflections on 
comparison. No one would deny, for example, that comparative thinking 
is heavily implicated in the history of colonialism. Much has been written 
on how temporal or evolutionary scales of comparison have portrayed non- 
Western cultures as backward or belated in relation to a European norm. 
(See, among others, Johannes Fabian’s account of the relations between time 
and cultural otherness, Edward Said on the relations between orientalism 
and primitivism, Homi Bhabha’s discussion of time lag, and Natalie Melas 
on the evolutionary assumptions underlying the history of comparative 
 literature.)19 Comparison is commonly decried for being tied up with forms 
of judgment that reinforce patterns of racial and cultural dominance. What is 
less frequently noted, however, is that the ethical force of this objection pivots 
on acts of comparison, without which the racial hierarchies and geopolitical 
inequities lamented by the critic would remain invisible. Comparison and 
the perception of inequality are intrinsically connected. The poison, in this 
sense, also turns out to be the only possible cure.
Comparison is thus not a one-sided or intrinsic nefarious technology 
of power. Rather, it is a form of relational thinking that can be deployed to 
many different ends. Certainly, comparing can be used to impose preexist-
ing categories on muted or marginalized others; to confirm the rightness of 
one’s view of the world; “to hector, proselytize, or hierarchize difference in 
the name of a dominant, ‘superior,’ identity.”20 It can promote indifference 
to the specifics of context, wrenching texts, ideas, or actions out of webs of 
local meaning in order to assert their similarity, superiority, or inferiority 
in relation to other phenomena that are similarly denuded. But it can also 
deliver a sobering jolt to consciousness and a brake on narcissism, initiating 
a humbling sense of the limits of one’s own perspective. Without explicit or 
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implicit comparison, it is hard to see how one could ever escape, for even a 
moment, the confines of one’s own experience and become aware of alternate 
ways of conceiving or inhabiting the world.
Friedman develops the point in her essay “Why Not Compare?” 
Conceding the various problems that bedevil comparison, she insists, 
nonetheless, that it is worse not to compare than to compare. Any form of 
theoretical thinking, for example, depends on conceptualizing, generalizing, 
and discerning patterns of similarity across differences. Meanwhile, she 
argues, “the refusal to compare can turn into a romance of the local, a retreat 
into the particular and identity based, a resistance to the cosmopolitan.” 
By contrast, “comparison across cultures defamiliarizes what one takes as 
‘natural’ in any given culture.”21 Rather than reinforcing a culture’s claim to 
a universally valid measure, comparison can unsettle it, driving home the 
difference—and sometimes the bewildering strangeness—of how others 
measure, assess, interpret, and evaluate. Meanwhile, Friedman goes on to 
argue, comparison does not simply decontextualize, but also recontextualizes: 
a double movement of alienation and re-embedding that can bring to light 
unexpected connections and illuminating parallels between phenomena 
separated in space and time.
It is noteworthy, in this context, that comparison across space—that is 
to say, across nations, cultures, or regions—has received far more attention 
in comparative literature than comparison across time. This imbalance may 
seem puzzling, given the historical framing of literary studies: the ubiquity 
of periodizing structures in the curriculum, job descriptions, grant applica-
tions, journal titles, and other aspects of scholarly practice.22 Yet it is precisely 
because periodization is so persistent that cross-temporal comparison is 
suspect: seen as evidence of dilettantism or insufficient professionalization. 
This taboo has been reinforced by the impact of New Historicism and 
other forms of what Wai Chee Dimock calls “synchronic historicism” that 
quarantine literary texts within a particular slice of time: usually the moment 
when they were first written or published.23
Here actor-network theory offers a provocation to business as usual 
in its emphasis on the ubiquity of transtemporal networks. Latour’s work 
scrambles and jumbles period distinctions (above all the distinction between 
tradition and modernity) in order to trace the flows of ideas, objects, and 
texts across time and to underscore their simultaneous copresence. “I may 
use an electric drill, but I also use a hammer,” he remarks in We Have Never 
Been Modern; “my habits range in age from a few days to several thousand 
years.”24 Rejecting a narrative of progress that pits the new and the now 
against the outdated and obsolete, this view is also at odds with a Foucauldian 
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conception of history as a sequence of incommensurable epistemes. Instead, 
its vision of time emphasizes borrowing, blending, blurring, and juxtaposing: 
we are immersed in a swirling confusion of texts, objects, ideas, and images 
that have weathered the forces of time, surviving centuries of wear and tear. 
Presentness contains countless examples of resilient and persistent pastness; 
seemingly defunct or moribund texts can be rebooted; old ideas trigger fresh 
and startling constellations of meaning. Such a framework offers a boost 
to those interested in cross-temporal comparison in literary and cultural 
studies, willing to risk charges of anachronism in order to trace proximity 
and connection.25
Latour persistently reframes matters of fact as matters of concern: under-
scoring how our orientations, interests, and commitments shape what we 
perceive and what we care about. Are we immured, then, in the prison-house 
of language, forever doomed to project our own assumptions onto the objects 
we study? Not quite. In the dialogue at the heart of Reassembling the Social, 
the professor questions the student’s view that our frameworks, paradigms, 
or belief systems lock us into a particular viewpoint. “Don’t believe all that 
crap about being ‘limited’ to one’s perspective. All the sciences have been 
inventing ways to move from one standpoint to the next . . . Enquiries, survey, 
fieldwork, archives, polls, whatever—we go, we learn, we practice, we become 
competent, we change our views. Very simple really; it’s called inquiries. Good 
inquiries always produce lots of new descriptions.”26 Care and attentiveness 
can produce new and enlightening accounts; our findings challenge as well 
as confirm our prejudices; certain writings can produce better versions of 
reality (yes, reality; a word Latour uses without scare quotes!) Meanwhile, 
the professor continues, it is not a question of avoiding comparison; but of 
being willing to engage one’s interlocutors as active makers of comparison rather 
than simply as objects to be compared: “they too compare; they, too, produce 
typologies; they, too, design standards.” Here as elsewhere, Latour urges 
scholars to listen attentively to the accounts of those they study, rather than 
treating lay actors as naifs in urgent need of Critical Theory 101.
How might this line of thinking relate to the idioms and interests 
of literary studies? We can see immediately that literature is a medium 
actively and intensively engaged in comparing. This may be especially true 
of contemporary examples of world literature that are “born translated,” as 
Rebecca Walkowitz puts it, that anticipate, reflect, and comment on their 
own international circulation, but the point holds more generally.27 Works of 
fiction, after all, commonly juxtapose and contrast characters; deploy analo-
gies and metaphors to telling effect; make links to previous works and past 
traditions; choreograph parallels or stand-offs between differing moralities 
CLS 53.4_05_Felski.indd   756 04/11/16   2:01 PM
757A  P e r s P e c t i v e  f r o m  A c t o r - N e t w o r k  t h e o r y
and worldviews. Indeed, literature would seem to be a virtual machine for 
generating comparisons. Following Latour, then, our aim as critics would not 
be to abjure or foreswear comparative thinking in order to pay homage to 
the “radical alterity” of the literary work. (Such a line of argument, it should 
be clear by now, makes no sense within actor-network theory.) Rather, it is a 
matter of juxtaposing, comparing, and confronting comparisons; positioning 
the literary text within pertinent frameworks, while allowing its own modes 
of comparing, measuring, and judging to speak back to these frameworks. 
In this way, we might get a little closer to Isabelle Stenger’s ideal:
Those you address must be empowered to evaluate the relevance of 
your interest, to agree or refuse to answer, and even to spit in your 
human, too human, face. . . “Learning from” requires encounter-
ing, and encountering may indeed imply comparison, but there is 
no comparison if the encountered others are defined as unable to 
understand the point of the comparison. We are returned here to 
the Latin etymology of “comparison”: compar designates those who 
regard each other as equals—that is, as able to agree, which means 
also able to disagree, object, negotiate, and contest.28
What might such an approach look like in practice? How might  literary 
works disagree, object, negotiate, and contest? One way of pursuing this idea 
in the classroom is by juxtaposing literature and theory without allowing 
the latter to single-handedly define the terms of discussion. For example, in 
a graduate seminar on “Comparative and Transnational Studies,” I assign 
classic essays of transnational and postcolonial theory, such as Kwame 
Anthony Appiah’s “Topologies of Nativism,” Linda Hutcheon’s “Rethinking 
the National Model,” Arjun Appadurai’s “Disjunctures and Differences 
in the Global Economy,” and the multiauthored “Creole Manifesto.” 
The cumulative effect of these readings inspires a skepticism about cat-
egories of race, ethnicity, and nation, to steer the class toward a language 
of becoming over being, of hybridity over identity, of transnational flows 
over rooted selves. Comparison becomes a matter of relativizing the force 
of belonging,  questioning the desire for familiar identities, exposing the 
romantic- regressive underpinnings of the desire for home. The case seems 
compelling and conclusive.
We then turn to Eva Hoffman’s Lost in Translation, which offers a rather 
different take on such issues. This difference is not an opposition: Hoffman’s 
memoir of a young Polish-Jewish woman who moves to Canada and then 
to the United States is certainly concerned with conflicting allegiances and 
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hybrid affinities. And yet it also explores the anguish of dislocation and the 
losses of migration, in ways that the theoretical essays fail to acknowledge. 
Describing her departure from Poland at the age of fifteen, Hoffman writes: 
“I am suffering my first severe attack of nostalgia, or tesknota, a word that 
adds to nostalgia the tonalities of sadness and longing . . . it comes upon me 
like a visitation from a whole new geography of emotions, an annunciation 
of how much an absence can hurt.”29 The phrase “geography of emotion” is 
telling; Hoffman’s attachment to the country of her birth is not just men-
tal, but affective and visceral: not in the sense of unmediated, but in being 
emotionally overwhelming and impossible to shrug off. Nostalgia has often 
had a bad press in contemporary theory: Lost in Translation offers a rich and 
multifaceted description of what it means to be affectively tied to another 
country, or to the past, as being far more than an intellectual error or a “myth 
of origin.” It offers, we might say, a phenomenology of attachment: one that 
does not so much refute as complicate and enrich the theoretical insights 
we previously encountered.
Meanwhile, Hoffman’s memoir also invites a rethinking of what can 
become a rather glib, even facile, celebration of difference in contemporary 
theory. “For all our sophisticated deftness at cross-cultural encounters,” she 
writes, “fundamental difference, when it is staring at you across the table 
from within the close-up face of a fellow human being, always contains an 
element of violation.”30 The affirmation of otherness is easily entertained 
as an intellectual proposition, she remarks, while proving to be much more 
painful and arduous in practice: when one is struggling to make sense of 
the motions and flavors of a radically different mode of existence, engaging 
with a fellow human being who is clamoring to be understood. And how 
much more so when one is a stranger in a new country, thrown into a world 
governed by unfathomable rules and opaque conventions! “It is only within 
an intelligible human context,” Hoffman continues, “that a face can become 
dear, a person known. Pattern is the soil of significance, and it is surely one 
of the hazards of emigration, and exile, and extreme mobility, that one is 
uprooted from that soil.”31 Speaking back to an academic language that 
favors disruption and destabilization, Hoffman suggests that such terms 
have limited purchase in grappling with the everyday rhythms of life as it is 
lived and with a persisting desire for connection, attachment, and meaning. 
By putting Lost in Translation into dialogue with examples of transnational 
and postcolonial theory, we can arrive at a more capacious understanding of 
the allure as well as the limits of home, nation, and nostalgia.32
Such an approach, no doubt, is in line with what many of us already 
strive for, whether in the classroom or our writing: balancing the claims of 
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literature and theory rather than measuring a literary work against a prede-
termined set of philosophical or political tenets. One difference, however, 
is that a Latourian approach does not draw its rationale from the ethos of 
critique—whether located in the wary and vigilant stance of the scholar or 
the subversive energies of the literary text. In a well-known essay, Latour 
contends that critique is running out of steam, that the academic practice 
of distancing ourselves from prevailing assumptions in order to interrogate 
their concealed agendas has become ubiquitous to the point of banality. Such 
a style of thinking, meanwhile, is increasingly appropriated by conservatives 
all too eager to show, for instance, that climate change is nothing but an 
ideological ruse. Rather than demystifying and debunking, Latour urges us 
toward another project of composing and caring for. “Can we devise another 
powerful descriptive tool that deals this time with matters of concern and 
whose import then will no longer be to debunk but to protect and to care, 
as Donna Haraway would put it? Is it really possible to transform the critical 
urge in the ethos of someone who adds reality to matters of fact and not 
subtract reality?”33
Here Latour is talking about the politics of science and climate change, 
but caring for the reality of phenomena is a task that applies equally to works 
of art, fictional worlds, and imaginary beings. “Every sculpture, painting, 
haute cuisine dish, techno-rave and novel,” he writes in Reassembling the 
Social, “has been explained to nothingness by the social factors hidden behind 
them.” A Latourian perspective has no interest in drawing back the curtain to 
reveal hidden causalities that weaken or relativize the force of works of art. It 
is equally uninterested in a favored alternative: “saving” and justifying works 
of art by revealing how they deconstruct, transgress, or rupture prevailing 
ideologies, as if this were their main rationale and reason for being. Works 
of art are neither lackeys of the status quo nor heroes of the resistance.
Both of these lines of thought presume the emancipatory force of the 
negative, whether exercised by the critic or imputed to the stealthy guerilla 
tactics and disruptive energies of a favored poem, film, or painting. And 
here, they are in accordance with an influential strain of twentieth-century 
philosophy and aesthetic theory. This history is far from homogeneous, and 
negativity can take on various shadings of mood as well as different methods; 
the forceful or vehement condemnations of ideology critique have given way, 
in recent times, to a more ironic posture of troubling and problematizing.34 
What these stances share, however, is the conviction that critique is the only 
imaginable path: that to be noncritical is to be consigned to the shamefulness 
of the uncritical. It is only by carving out a distance from what is given that 
change becomes possible; it is only via acts of critique that we can achieve 
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genuine insight and acquire a modicum of agency. The negative, in this 
sense, is flipped into a positive.
In actor-network theory, by contrast, the stress lies on the making of ties 
rather than the breaking of ties. Attachment is a key concept, defined as an 
affective state; a social principle, and an ontological fact. That attachment is 
an affective state means that we cannot “not care” about certain phenomena, 
and that such preferences set the tone for our engagement in the world. That 
it is a social fact means that we no longer organize social analysis around 
oppositions of structure versus agency or text versus context, but instead trace 
out the coalescing of actors into constellations, networks, and groupings. And 
that it is an ontological reality means that our existence is only possible via our 
reliance on countless coactors. Left to our own devices, we would swiftly sink 
into the abyss of nonexistence; relations are not just modes of regulation but 
inescapable conditions of being. “We need no longer distinguish between the 
restrained and the liberated,” observes Latour, “but instead between the well 
and the poorly attached.”35 It is not that a Latourian model does not allow for 
disjuncture, disagreement, or detachment—the opposite is true—but that such 
acts of disassociation themselves depend on prior ties or bonds. We detach 
from something because we are more attached to something else: even if only 
to an image of the intellectual as a lonely or embattled figure-in-exile.
A stress on negation thus gives way to an emphasis on relation—and 
an insistence that the range, variety, and unpredictability of these relations 
are often poorly understood by current critical theories. Like William 
James, Latour is a philosophical comparatist attentive to both conjunctions 
and disjunctions: neither organic unity nor radical instability, then, but 
articulations of similarities and differences through which ties are formed.36 
The strength and durability of these articulations varies; some institutions, 
cultural patterns, or constructions of fact spin strong webs of support or 
compliance and are sustained over time, while other fail to attract sufficient 
coactors and plummet from sight. These coactors, we should recall, include 
both human and nonhuman participants. Modern science, for example, is 
neither a distillation of pure truth from the dregs of superstition, nor an 
arbitrary linguistic schema imposed on an inert and mute world. Rather, it 
is composed of extended networks of animate and inanimate agents that 
include atoms, blood cells, sunlight, gravity, and lab equipment as well as 
textbooks, Stephen Hawkings biopics, and sexist hiring practices. What 
look like substances turn out to be swarming aggregates; things become real 
by amassing allies, expanding ties, and thereby sustaining their existence.37 
The point holds equally well whether we are thinking of the law of relativity, 
Shakespeare’s first folio, or theories of gender as performance.
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The consequences of this reorientation are significant. Accounts of 
 literature and art invariably presume some larger view of the world, even if 
they claim to be purely formalist. However different they may be in their lan-
guage, assumptions, and politics, such frameworks as New Criticism, Marxist 
aesthetics (Adorno), and deconstruction share a belief in the singularity of the 
literary work, as distinct from the overbearing sameness of larger forces. The 
artwork rejects, refutes, resists, or withdraws from these forces, whether they 
are located in a tawdry mass culture, the means-end thinking of bourgeois 
ideology, or the fantasy of presence in Western metaphysics. Theories of art 
have thus been closely associated with an ethos of againstness.38
Actor-network theory refuses both sides of this art–society opposition. 
On the one hand, “society” gives way to an emphasis on associations and 
assemblages, some relatively stable, others much more contingent or short-
lived, whose empirical features and connections must be traced. We are no 
longer battling a leviathan of oppressive homogeneity and normative same-
ness. By the same token, the art work can no longer be hailed as a beacon 
of radical autonomy, shining singularity, or resplendent otherness. No less 
than British prime ministers, coke cans, or gerbils, art works are entangled 
with countless other actors that make their existence possible. Identity and 
nonidentity are thus equally immaterial, given that actors are neither unified 
and self-contained nor avatars of negativity, but gain their meaning and 
force via their relations.
ANT thus draws us away from a negative aesthetics (whether couched 
in a Marxist-Hegelian language of opposition or a poststructuralist idiom 
of subversion) to a relational ontology that traces ties between actors. Why 
do literary works matter? Because they create, or co-create, powerful and enduring 
ties across space and time. The nature of these ties (social imaginaries, affective 
bonds, visions of art, redescriptions of reality) and how they made (techniques 
of invention, borrowing, dissemination) become the loci of our attention. 
The emphasis is no longer on scission or rupture, but on entanglement, a 
term that has also been productively explored by Ian Hodder and Sarah 
Nuttall, among others.39 Meanwhile, as we’ve seen, the range of objects 
we can describe extends well beyond the usual suspects in literary studies. 
Obviously the novel Madame Bovary is a pertinent actor for literary scholars, 
as are associated literary memes of “impassibilité” and Flaubertian style. But 
so too, is the fictional character, Emma Bovary, who has achieved a hectic 
afterlife beyond the boundaries of the novel that created her. (Latour’s recent 
work contains stimulating insights into the realness of characters and other 
fictional beings.)40 Flaubert is a potentially relevant actor, as are the social and 
literary circles of mid-nineteenth-century Paris. But so too are contemporary 
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syllabi, amazon.com reviews, the light in a café that caused Flaubert’s novel 
to resonate in a new way, my friend’s melancholy on reading the final pages. 
It is no longer matter of looking only at texts; or of explaining those texts by 
invoking the box of historical–political contexts; but of tracing hybrid and 
heterogeneous constellations of texts, persons, and things. This openness 
to the kinds of actors that make literature matter is, in my view, one of the 
most exciting contributions of ANT to literary studies.
Perhaps a brief example from Latour’s friend and colleague Antoine 
Hennion may help clarify the point. In contrast to Bourdieu, who invokes 
the “love of art” in order to demystify it, Hennion is sympathetic to lovers of 
art. But how does this love come about? “Loving music is not simply a matter 
of a particular piece; it passes through a multitude of mediators, beginning 
with the present (the sound of an instrument, the atmosphere of a hall, the 
grain of a record, the tone of a voice, the body of a musician) and in the 
duration of a history (scores, repertoires and styles, genres, and more or less 
stable forms), as well as for each individual—a past, works heard, moments 
lost, desires unfulfilled, roads travelled with others, and so on.”41 Not all of 
these actors, of course, can be dealt with in a single analysis; but the onus 
is on the critic to justify what counts and what is relevant to the network 
she is tracing. (No one else can make this decision for her!) Meanwhile, the 
music is a crucial and dynamic coactor, not just an epiphenomenon of other 
forces; that it is Bach rather than Beethoven, or Motley Crue rather than 
Metallica, matters enormously to a music lover. Music “does something else 
than what the humans gathered around it would like it to do, something 
other than what they have programed. This is why they listen to it; it is not 
their double, nor the mirror of their vanity.”42 By valuing the work of art, yet 
seeing this value as dynamically coproduced, ANT’s language of mediation 
helps to breaks down the sterile dualisms that pit aesthetics against social 
theories of art.
So where does all this leave us? On the “ideas of the decade” page of the 
American Comparative Literature Association, Shaden M. Tageldin remarks, 
in a phrase that echoes the assumptions of other influential comparatists: 
“Impasse and imposture—if not sheer impossibility—haunt the dream of 
translatability.”43 Actor-network theory would retort that translatability is 
not just a dream, but a reality: an ongoing and inescapable basis of mediation 
and communication between actors. It is not translatability that is impossi-
ble, but only “perfect translatability” (Latour’s “double click)—a dream that 
we would indeed do well to relinquish. But why make this the benchmark 
for thinking about translation? Why invoke an unachievable ideal in order 
to lament, again and again, the inevitable failings of language in use? The 
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result, as Eve Sedgwick remarks, is a self-confirming anticipation of grim 
news and the impossibility of ever being surprised.44
Thanks to its empirical focus and its emphasis on the contingency 
and variability of associations, actor-network theory leaves ample room for 
surprise. Meanwhile, its stress on relation offers an alternative to an ethos of 
negation and the assumption that critique is the most rigorous and radical 
style of thought. Instead of a reflexive critique of comparison, ANT insists 
on the inescapability of comparison and the need to weigh up its differing 
uses; instead of railing against translation, we are required to consider the and 
trade-offs of particular translations. And rather than stressing detachment, 
ANT insists on the inescapability of our attachments. (See, e.g., Hiro Saito’s 
questioning of any notion of cosmopolitanism as a “lonely exile” and his 
counterclaim that cosmopolitanism is a matter of multiplying attachments to 
foreign humans and nonhumans.)45 At the level of both method and mood, 
ANT thus offers a rather different approach to the critical frameworks that 
have dominated comparative literature in recent decades. It remains to be 
seen whether these intellectual strangers can become partners, whether—as I 
would like to hope—alliances will be established and networks will be created.
rita felski is William R. Kenan Professor of English at the University of 
Virginia and the editor of New Literary History.
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